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J This is the first of two articles on the Ohio law of homi-
) cide. This article discusses the crimes of murder and aggra-
.. vated murder, including recent statutory amendments. The 
, next article will examine other types of homicides and is-
~ sues of causation. 
) Ohio divides murder into two categories: murder and ag-
gravated murder. Aggravated murder is further divided into 
five categories: (1) a purposeful killing with prior calculation 
and design, (2) a purposeful killing during the commission 
of specified felonies, (3) a purposeful killing of a child under 
thirteen years of age, (4) a purposeful killing while the actor 
is under detention, or is breaking detention, as a result of a 
felony conviction, and (5) a purposeful killing of a law en-
forcement officer if the victim is engaged in official duties at 
the time of the offense, or if the offender's specific purpose 
was to kill a law enforcement officer. The death penalty may 
~be imposed only for aggravated murder. 
There are two categories of murder: (1) a purposeful 
killing, and (2) causing a death during the commission of 
specified violent felonies. 
There are also two types of manslaughter: (1) voluntary 
and (2) involuntary. In addition, Ohio recognizes negligent 
homicide as a crime. Finally, two provisions govern vehicu-
lar homicides. 
Because homicides are defined in terms of a result 
(death), causation issues may arise. See 3 Katz & Giannelli, 
Baldwin's Ohio Practice, Criminal Law ch. 96 (1996). 
COMMON LAW HOMICIDES 
At common law, homicide was defined as the killing of a 
human being. There were three common law homicides: 
(1) murder, (2) voluntary manslaughter, and (3) involuntary 
manslaughter. There were no degrees of murder at com-
mon law; first and second degree murder are classifications 
created by statute in this country during the 19th Century. 
Common Law Murder 
Common law murder was the unlawful killing of a human 
being ''with malice aforethought." This crime included an in-
tentional killing (express malice). Over time murder also 
came to include situations of "implied malice;' of which there 
were three. First, a killing committed during the commission 
of a felony constituted "felony-murder:' Second, a killing in 
which the accused intended to inflict great bodily injury, 
rather than death, also was considered murder if death re-
sulted. Third, a killing caused by extreme reckless conduct 
was similarly classified as murder, often called "depraved 
heart" or "abandoned and malignant hearf' murder. This 
crime was characterized by a reckless indifference to an un-
justifiably high risk to human life, such as playing Russian 
roulette, shooting into an occupied house, and sometimes 
drag-racing related deaths. 
Common Law Felony-Murder 
Originally, felony-murder involved any killing, even if acci-
dental, which occurred during the commission of a felony. 
"Malice" was implied from the intent to commit the underly-
ing felony. At the time this crime was developing, there were 
few felonies, and those few were punishable by death. 
Accordingly, it made little difference in many cases whether 
the condemned prisoner was executed for murder or for the 
predicate felony. As the number of felonies increased and 
the number of felonies subject to the death penalty de-
creased, the common Jaw courts began to limit the scope of 
the felony-murder doctrine. 
At least four limitations are noteworthy. First, some 
courts required that the felony be independent of the killing. 
Manslaughter or aggravated battery (as lesser offenses of 
murder) are not independent felonies and therefore do not 
qualify as the underlying felony. 1 LaFave & Scott, 
Substantive Criminai Law§ 7.5(g) (i986). Uniike rape, 
arson, burglary, robbery, and kidnaping, which are indepen-
dent, manslaughter and aggravated battery are said to 
merge with the conduct resulting in the death. Second, 
some courts mandated that the death be foreseeable; other-
wise the felony was not considered the proximate cause of 
the death.ld. § 7.5(d). Third, the death must occur during 
the commission of the felony. This limitation created a tem-
poral limitation, in which the beginning and end of the felony 
must be defined. Since felony-murder often extended to at-
tempts, the law of attempt frequently determined the com-
mencement of the time period. Similarly, felony-murder 
often extends to deaths caused while "fleeing" the felony; 
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thus, it became necessary to determine a termination date 
for the time of flight. Here, the common law said that once 
the felon had reached a place of "temporary safety," the 
felony-murder rule ceased. ld. § 7.5(f). Fourth, the death of 
a cofelon was often not punishable as felony-murder if the 
death was caused bv an innocent third party, such as a po-
lice officer, a victim, or a bystander. ld. § 7 .5(c). This limita-
tion, however, did not extend to the death of an innocent 
person caused by the conduct of another innocent third 
party -for example, where the policeman kills a bystander 
while attempting to capture the felon. In that situation, the 
felon was held responsible for the death. 
Statutory Changes 
Modern homicide statutes frequently divide murder into 
two degrees. Typically, first degree murder statutes in this 
country encompass (1) "deliberate and premeditated" mur-
ders, and (2) felony-murder but limited to the most danger-
ous felonies- e.g., arson, robbery, burglary, rape, and kid-
naping. 
The "deliberation and premeditation" formula required re-
flection, albeit for only minutes in some jurisdictions. It en-
compassed a planned murder as opposed to a sudden im-
pulse murder, which constituted second degree murder. 
Note, however, that both first and second degree murder in-
volve intentional killings. In other words, the distinction is 
not between intended and unintended killings, but rather be-
tween premeditated intentional killings and unpremeditated 
intentional killings. Premeditated killings were considered 
more heinous, a rather questionable proposition. First-de-
gree murder statutes in this country also often include 
killings "by lying in wait, poison, or torture:' Since these 
murders all require premeditation, this type of provision 
could be viewed as a redundant category. 
PROOF OF LIFE AND DEATH 
By definition, homicide means the killing of a human 
being. It is not murder to shoot a corpse, although it may be 
some other crime (e.g., offenses against a corpse) and 
under certain circumstances it may be attempted murder 
(e.g., if the actor believed that the corpse was alive). 
Accordingly, the law of homicide requires defining when life 
begins and when it ends. 
Under the common law, life began when the "victim" was 
"born alive:· State v. Robbins, 8 Ohio St. 131, 192 (1857) 
("under our statute, neither degree of criminal homicide can 
be predicated upon the killing of an unborn child"). In State 
v. Dickinson, 28 Ohio St.2d 65, 70-71, 275 N.E.2d 599 
(1971), the Ohio Supreme Court refused to alter the com-
mon law definition of "live birth:' The defendant's car struck 
another car, in which a seven-month pregnant woman was a 
passenger. Prior to the accident, the fetus was viable and 
capable of sustaining life. The Court wrote: 
The law has long been clear that to establish the cor-
pus delicti in the murder of a newborn child, the evi-
dence must show that the infant was born alive .... In 
the absence of a specific statute to the contrary, this 
same element is essential for a conviction of vehicular 
homicide in Ohio. Since the evidence in this case does 
not indicate that the child was born alive, a conviction 
cannot stand. 
See also State v. Gray, 62 Ohio St.3d 514, 517, 584 N.E.2d 
710 (1992) (parent may not be prosecuted for child endan-
germent for substance abuse occurring before the birth of 
the child). 
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By statutory amendment (1996), however, homicides 
now encompass the "unlawful termination of another's preg-
nancy:· See R.C. 2903.09(A)(definition). Although this pro-
vision was challenged on constitutional grounds, it was up-
held in State v. Coleman, 124 Ohio App.3d 78, 80, 705 
N.E.2d 419 (1997). 
At one time, defining death was relatively simple. When 
a victim's heart and lungs stopped, that person was legally 
dead. However, with modern advances in medicine, "brain 
death" has supplanted "respiratory" death. 1 LaFave & 
Scott, Substantive Criminal Law§ 7.1 (1986). The Ohio 
Supreme Court adopted this definition in State v. Johnson, 
56 Ohio St.2d 35, 40, 381 N.E.2d 637 (1978): 
There was testimony at trial by both the coroner and 
attending physician that the proximate cause of death 
was severe head trauma as a result of an extensive 
skull fracture. This evidence was uncontroverted, but 
for the bare assertion that Dr. Walus decided to no 
longer continue the supplemental oxygen supply 
[through an artificial respirator] to the patient after four 
days of testing showed brain death. 
See also State v. Long, 7 Ohio App.3d 248, 250, 555 N.E.2d 
(1983). Moreover, R.C. 2108.30 also defines death as 
"brain death" for physician liability purposes. 
Typically, proof of death is a straightforward proposition. 
A coroner or forensic pathologist will testify about the autop-
sy. Crime scene photographs also establish the fact of 
death. See 2 Giannelli & Snyder, ,Baldwin's Ohio Practice, 
Evidence § 901.17 (1996) (photographs). However, if the 
victim's body is not recovered, proof of death becomes 
more problematic. Nevertheless, death may be proved 
through circumstantial evidence, even in the absence of the 
victim's body. E.g., State v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 150, 
529 N.E.2d 1236 (1988) ("It is well-established that murder 
can be proven in the absence of a body:'); State v. Dudley, 
19 Ohio App.2d 14, 25, 249 N.E.2d 536 (1969) ("[U]nder 
present day concepts, production of a 'body' is not absolute-
ly essential to convict, even in a murder case:'); Perkins, 
The Corpus Delicti of Murder, 48 Va. L. Rev. 173 (1962). 
MURDER 
Until recently, murder was defined as purposely causing 
the death of another person. R.C. 2903.02(A). In 1998, a 
second category of murder, a type of felony-murder, was 
enacted by amendment. 
Recent Amendment 
R.C. 2903.02(B) defines murder to also include a death 
that is the proximate result of the offender's committing or 
attempting to commit an offense of violence that is a felony 
of the first or second degree and that is not a violation of 
R.C. 2903.03 (voluntary manslaughter) or R.C. 2903.04 (in-
voluntary manslaughter). An "offense of violence" is defined 
in R.C. 2901.01 (A)(9). In addition, R.C. 2903.02(C) speci-
fies that division (B) does not apply to felonies that become 
first or second degree felonies due to a prior conviction. 
In effect, Ohio now has three categories of felony-murder, 
depending on the seriousness of the underlying felony: (1) 
aggravated murder for specified offenses (kidnaping, rape, 
aggravated arson, arson, aggravated robbery, robbery, ag-
gravated burglary, burglary, and escape), (2) murder for 
specified crimes of violence, and (3) involuntary manslaugh-
ter for other felonies. 
Related Crimes 
One type of murder {Division {A), purposeful killing) is a 
lesser-included-offense of aggravated murder. See 
Legislative Service Commission {1973) {''This section de-
fines murder simply as the purposeful killing of another, and 
"(\the offense can thus be a lesser included offense to both 
forms of aggravated murder:'); Ohio Jury Instruction § 
503.015{A) {murder as a lesser included-offense). This type 
of murder differs from aggravated murder in that it does not 
require the additional element of "prior calculation and de-
sign;· commission of an enumerated felony, a child under 13 
or law enforcement officer as the victim, or while the offend-
er is under detention pursuant to a felony conviction. 
Murder differs from voluntary manslaughter because the 
latter, although a purposeful killing, must have been commit-
ted in the sudden heat of passion upon sufficient provoca-
tion. The provocation is thought to mitigate the offense. 
Depraved Heart Murder 
The Ohio statute does not recognize "depraved heart 
murder"- a type of common-law murder, in which death is 
caused by extremely reckless conduct. See 1 LaFave & 
Scott, Substantive Criminal Law§ 7 .4{a), at 201 {1986) {"A 
very significant minority of the modern codes do not recog-
nize this type of murder at all:'){citing the Ohio statute). The 
Ohio involuntary manslaughter, negligent homicide, and ve-
hicular homicide statutes cover some {but not all) of the 
conduct that would have been criminalized as "depraved 
hearf' murder at common law. 
Mens Rea: Purpose 
The required mental element in Division {A) is "purpose:· 
One court has ruled that it is not error for an indictment to 
~ substitute the mental element of knowledge. State v. 
Thompson, No. 9-81-9 {3d Dist. Ct. App., 3-3-82). However, 
under the Code's definition of purpose, the intention of the 
accused must be to achieve the proscribed result -the 
death of another person. Knowledge is not sufficient. See 
R.C. 2901.22{A) {"A person acts purposely when it is his 
specific intention to cause a certain result."). For example, a 
person who plants a bomb on his own airplane in order to 
collect insurance may not have the "purpose" to kill the pilot, 
although the offender has knowledge that the pilot's death is 
almost certain. See RC 2901.22{8) {"A person acts know-
ingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that his 
conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably 
be of a certain nature:'). 
Circumstantial Evidence 
Circumstantial evidence is frequently used in homicide 
prosecutions. In many instances circumstantial evidence is 
more reliable than direct evidence. See State v. Richey, 64 
Ohio St.3d 353, 363, 595 N.E.2d 915 {1992) {"Indeed, cir-
cumstantial evidence may be more certain, satisfying and 
persuasive than direct evidence:'), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 
989 {1993); State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 167, 555 
N.E.2d 293 {1990); State v. Turner, Wright 20, 28 {1831) 
{"[c]ircumstantial evidence is often the most convincing. It is 
difficult to fabricate the connected links in a chain of circum-
stances .... It is [easier] ... to fabricate positive facts:'). 
Nevertheless, for a long time the Ohio Supreme Court 
I employed a special rule to evaluate the sufficiency of cir-
cumstantial evidence in criminal cases. In State v. Kulig, 37 
Ohio St.2d 157, 309 N.E.2d 897 {1974) {syllabus), the Court 
held that "[c]ircumstantial evidence relied upon to prove an 
essential element of a crime must be irreconcilable with any 
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reasonable theory of an accused's innocence in order to 
support a finding of guilt:' This position was criticized as 
more misleading than helpful. For example, the United 
States Supreme Court commented: "[T]he better rule is that 
where the jury is properly instructed on the standards for 
reasonable doubt, such an additional instruction on circum-
stantial evidence is confusing and incorrect." Holland v. 
United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-40 {1954). 
In State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 
{1991), the Ohio Supreme Court overruled Kulig and its 
prior position on circumstantial evidence. The Court wrote: 
Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherent-
ly possess the same probative value and therefore 
should be subjected to the same standard of proof. 
When the state relies on circumstantial evidence to 
prove an essential element of the offense charged, 
there is no need for such evidence to be irreconcilable 
with any reasonable theory of innocence in order to 
support a conviction. Therefore, where the jury is 
properly and adequately instructed as to the standards 
for reasonable doubt a special instruction as to circum-
stantial evidence is not required. 
See also State v. Webb, 70 Ohio St.3d 325, 331, 638 N.E.2d 
1 023 {1994) {"[A] rule changing the quantum of proof re-
quired for conviction may be applied to trials of crimes com-
mitted before the rule was announced, without violating the 
Ex Post Facto Clause:'); State v. Grant, 67 Ohio St.3d 465, 
473, 620 N.E.2d 50 {1993) {"[T]his court has rejected the 
concept that circumstantial evidence must be 'irreconcilable 
with any reasonable theory of innocence in order to support 
a conviction."'). 
Circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to sup-
port a homicide conviction. E.g., State v. Richey, 64 Ohio 
St.3d 353, 363, 595 N.E.2d 915 {1992), cert. denied, 507 
U.S. 507 U.S. 989 {1993); State v. Apanovitch, 33 Ohio St.3d 
19, 27,514 N.E.2d 394 {1987) {"[A] conviction based upon 
purely circumstantial evidence may be just as reliable as a 
conviction based on direct evidence, if not more so."); State 
v. Hankerson, 70 Ohio St.2d 87,434 N.E.2d 1362 {1982), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 870 {1982). 
This is true of a murder conviction even in the absence of 
the victim's body. E.g., State v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 
150, 529 N.E.2d 1236 {1988) {"It is well-established that 
murder can be proven in the absence of a body."); State v. 
Dudley, 19 Ohio App.2d 14, 25, 249 N.E.2d 536 {1969) 
{"[U]nder present day concepts, production of a 'body' is not 
absolutely essential to convict, even in a murder case."); 
Perkins, The Corpus Delicti of Murder, 48 Va. L. Rev. 173 
{1962). 
Circumstantial Evidence: Mens Rea 
The intent to kill {"purpose") need not be proved by direct 
testimony, but may be deduced from the surrounding cir-
cumstances, including the instrument used, its tendency to 
destroy life if designed for that purpose, and the manner in 
which the wound was inflicted. State v. Burke, 73 Ohio St.3d 
399,653 N.E.2d 242 {1995). See also State v. Phillips, 74 
Ohio St.3d 72, 82, 656 N.E.2d 643 {1995) {"A blunt force 
traumatic injury to Sheila's chest bruised internal organs 
and caused them to bleed. The use of such substantial 
force by an adult on a three-year-old victim is certainly suffi~ 
cient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find a 
purpose to kill:'); State v. Shue, 97 Ohio App.3d 459, 468, 
646 N.E.2d 1156 {1994) {"A jury can reasonably infer that a 
defendant formed the specific intent to kill from the fact that 
a firearm is an inherently dangerous instrument, the use of 
which is likely to produce death, coupled with relevant cir-
cumstantial evidence:'); State v. Brown, 112 Ohio App.3d 
583, 604, 679 N.E.2d 361 (1996) ("Further substantial evi-
dence showed that appellant became angry with [her 8 year 
old son] on the morning of his murder, struck him in the 
chest causing injury, drove him to the end of Union Chapel 
Road, and ran him over with her station wagon, leaving him 
to die:'). 
The Ohio Supreme Court has written: 
The law has long recognized that intent, lying as it 
does within the privacy of a person's own thoughts, is 
not susceptible of objective proof. The law recognizes 
that intent can be determined from the surrounding 
facts and circumstances, and persons are presumed 
to have intended the natural, reasonable and probable 
consequences of their voluntary acts. Intent "can 
never be proved by the direct testimony of a third per-
son and it need not be. It must be gathered from the 
surrounding facts and circumstances:• 
State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 60, 656 N.E.2d 623 
(1995) (quoting State v. Huffman, 131 Ohio St. 27, 1 N.E.2d 
313 (1936)(syllabus 4)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1444 
(1996). The Court also wrote: "We unhesitatingly find that 
the natural, reasonable and probable consequence of 
Garner's having set three separate fires in an apartment oc-
cupied by six children age thirteen and under is that those 
children would die. There was thus sufficient evidence to 
support the jury's finding that Garner possessed the requi-
site mental elements of the crime of aggravated murder:· ld. 
Instructions 
A trial court's instruction in a murder prosecution that the 
purpose with which a person acts or brings about a result 
may be determined from the manner in which it was done, 
the means used, and other facts and circumstances in evi-
dence, does not operate to relieve the prosecutor of the bur-
den of persuasion or create a mandatory presumption. 
State v. Wilson, 7 4 Ohio St.3d 381, 659 N.E.2d 292 (1996). 
The word "presumption" or "presume" should never be used 
in a jury instruction. 
An instruction informing a jury that it may infer "purpose" 
from the use of a deadly weapon is constitutional. 
According to the Ohio Supreme Court, the trial "court used 
the word 'may,' indicating that the presumption was permis-
sive - one the jury could accept, not one that the jury was 
required to accept:' State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 196, 
702 N.E.2d 866 (1998)(The instruction provided: "If a 
wound is inflicted upon a person with a deadly weapon in a 
manner calculated to destroy life the purpose to kill may be 
inferred from the use of the weapon:'). Accord State v Loza, 
71 Ohio St.3d 61, 81, 641 N.E.2d 1082 (1994). 
Transferred Intent 
When an actor aims at one person but misses and hits a 
second person, the law usually holds the actor guilty of the 
murder of the second person. Thus, "when one person (A) 
acts (or omits to act) with intent to harm another person (B), 
but because of bad aim he instead harms a third person (C) 
whom he did not intend to harm, the law considers him (as it 
ought) just as guilty as if he had actually harmed the intend-
ed victim:' 1 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 
3.12(d), at 400 (1986). This is called "transferred intent": 
A's intent to kill B is transferred to C. "The doctrine of trans-
ferred intention is firmly rooted in Ohio law:· State v. Richey, 
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64 Ohio St.3d 353, 364, 555 N.E.2d 915 (1992), cert. de-
nied, 507 U.S. 989 (1993). See also State v. Sowell, 39 
Ohio St.3d 322, 331, 530 N.E.2d 1294 (1988) ("[T1he indict-
ment is accurate in that appellant acted with prior calcula-
tion and design in killing Graham under the doctrine of 
transferred intent:'). 
AGGRAVATED MURDER: 
PRIOR CALCULATION & DESIGN 
There are five types of aggravated murder: (1) a pur-
poseful killing that is the product of prior calculation and de-
sign, (2) a purposeful killing during the commission of speci-
fied felonies, (3) a purposeful killing of a child under thirteen 
years of age, (4) a purposeful killing while the actor is under 
detention (or is breaking detention) as a result of a felony 
conviction, and (5) a purposeful killing of a law enforcement 
officer if the victim is engaged in official duties at the time of 
the offense, or if the offender's specific purpose was to kill a 
law enforcement officer. R.C. 2903.01. Aggravated murder 
is the only capital offense in Ohio; the penalty for aggravat-
ed murder is death or life imprisonment. 3 Katz & Giannelli, 
Baldwin's Ohio Practice, Criminal Law chs.115-17 ( 1996). 
Mens Rea: "Purpose" 
The first culpable mental state for all types of aggravated 
murder, like murder under R.C. 2903.02, is "purpose:· 
Accordingly, ihe above discussion of that mental state ap-
plies here as well. The difference between murder and the 
first type of aggravated murder is the additional mental state 
of "prior calculation and design;· an element thought to 
demonstrate cold bloodedness. 
Mens Rea: "Prior Calculation and Design" 
There were no degrees of murder at common law. When 
first adopted in this country, first degree murder statutes 
used the term "premeditation." 
The substitution of the term "prior calculation and design" 
in the Ohio statute in lieu of the term "premeditation," the tra-
ditional phraseology in this country, was intended to exclude 
from the definition of aggravated murder those killings 
where the intention is formed without some pre-planning. 
See Ohio Jury Instructions § 503.01 (A) (defining prior calcu-
lation and design). Without this distinction, there is no differ-
ence between aggravated murder and murder, and juries 
can be given no meaningful direction. This change in lan-
guage represents a rejection of the judicial interpretation of 
the former Code section, which held that murder couid be 
"premeditated" even though the fatal plan was conceived 
and executed on the spur of the moment; the only require-
ment was that the malicious purpose be formed before the 
homicidal act, however short in time -"a matter of sec-
onds:' State v. Stewart, 176 Ohio St. 156, 198 N.E.2d 439 
(1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947 (1964). The statute 
restates the former crime of premeditated murder so 
as to embody the classic concept of the planned, cold-
blooded killing while discarding the notion that only an 
instant's prior deliberation is necessary. By judicial in-
terpretation of the former Ohio law, murder could be 
premeditated even though the fatal plan was con-
ceived and executed on the spur of the moment. 
Legislative Service Commission (1973) ("See, State v. 
Schaffer, 113 Ohio App 125 (Lawrence Co App, 1960). The 
section employs the phrase, "prior calculation and design;· 
to indicate studied care in planning or analyzing the means 
of the crime, as well as a scheme compassing the death of 
,i 
( 
the victim. Neither the degree of care nor the length of time 
the offender takes to ponder the crime beforehand are criti-
cal factors in themselves, but they must amount to more 
than momentary deliberation:'). 
The Ohio Supreme Court has acknowledged that "prior 
(\ calculation and design" is a more stringent element than the 
prior judicial interpretation of "premeditation:' In State v. 
Cotton, 56 Ohio St.2d 8, 11, 388 N.E.2d 755 (1979), the 
Court recognized that the intent of the legislature was ''to re-
quire more than a few moments of deliberation ... and to re-
quire a scheme designed to implement the calculated deci-
sion to kill." The Court went on to say that "instantaneous 
deliberation is not sufficient to constitute 'prior calculation 
and design."' ld. This does not mean, however, that a con-
siderable time lapse between the time a decision to kill is 
made and the actual killing is required. Nor, does the Ohio 
Supreme Court focus upon the details of the plan and the 
care taken in its execution as some states have. E.g., 
People v. Anderson, 70 Cal.2d 15, 447 P.2d 942 (1968). 
For example, in Cotton, the defendant ran from a store 
and was pursued by two officers. After striking one of the 
officers who had caught him, the defendant grabbed that of-
ficer's gun and shot the second officer. Cotton then wres-
tled the first officer to the ground and fired two shots at him. 
The defendant next ran to his car where he came upon the 
. second officer who was wounded. The defendant assumed 
a shooting position and fired the fatal shot into the second 
officer. Obviously, the defendant did not plan the killing; nor 
did he have considerable time to think about his actions. 
The Court nevertheless affirmed an aggravated murder con-
viction, holding that the evidence revealed "sufficient time 
and opportunity between the appearance of the police offi-
r) cers on the scene and the fatal shot ... for the planning of 
the killing and for the planning to constitute prior calcula-
tion:' See also State v. Stoudemire, 118 Ohio App.3d 752, 
757-58, 694 N.E.2d 86 (1997) ("Instantaneous deliberation 
is insufficient to constitute prior calculation and design .... In 
effect, he maintains that the circumstances of the killing 
were so poorly thought out that no rational person would 
have premeditated them. The absence of foresight does not 
necessarily prove the lack of a coherent plan to murder a 
person-there is such a thing as a bad plan. One could 
also conclude that defendant simply did not care who saw 
him commit the murder .... "). 
In another case, State v. Robbins, 58 Ohio St.2d 74, 78-
79, 388 N.E.2d 755 (1979), the Supreme Court upheid an 
aggravated murder conviction where an angry defendant 
assaulted his victim in the hallway of the defendant's apart-
ment house. While the victim was on the floor, the defen-
dant rushed into his own apartment and retrieved a long 
knife or sword from under his mattress. He then returned to 
the hall, where his victim was still on the floor asking to be 
let alone, and stabbed the victim to death. In rejecting the 
defense contention that death occurred after only momen-
tary deliberation during a heated brawl, the Court stated 
that the initial aggression followed by the defendant's return 
to his apartment to secure the weapon, which he used in-
stants later, was sufficient to support a finding of "prior cal-
culation and design:' See also State v. Awkal, 76 Ohio St.3d 
324, 330, 667 N.E.2d 960 (1996) ("Prior to the shooting, 
I Awkal threatened to kill his wife and her family, and bought 
a gun:'); State v. Ballew, 76 Ohio St.3d 244, 250, 667 
N.E.2d 369 (1996) ("Ballew 'adopted a plan to kill."')( quoting 
State v. Toth, 52 Ohio St.2d 206, 213, 371 N.E.2d 831 
(1977)); State v. D'Ambrosio, 67 Ohio St.3d 185, 196, 616 
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N.E.2d 909 (1993) (" '[P]rior calculation and design' requires 
a scheme designed to implement the calculated decision to 
kill:') (quoting Cotton). 
In State v. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 20, 676 N.E.2d 82 
(1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 143 (1997), the Ohio 
Supreme Court wrote that "it is not possible to formulate a 
bright-line test that emphatically distinguishes between the 
presence or absence of 'prior calculation and design.' 
Instead, each case turns on the particular facts and evi-
dence presented at trial." The Court held that there was suf-
ficient evidence in the record for the jury to find prior calcu-
lation and design. As to the time interval, the Court noted 
that "[e]ven though most of the evidence indicates that the 
time between the jukebox incident and the shooting was 
only two or three minutes, there was more than sufficient 
evidence for the jury to reasonably have found that appel-
lant, with prior calculation and design, decided to shoot 
Alexander in that space of time:· I d. at 22. This statement, 
however, must be read in light of other factors cited by the 
Court. First, the accused and the victim had a prior hostile 
relationship. Second, the accused brought a gun into the 
bar where he knew the victim drank. Third, several of the 
shots were fired after the victim was already wounded and 
lying on the floor. As the victim tried to crawl away, the ac-
cused "walked closer and fired three or four shots into his 
back." Under these circumstances, there was more than "in-
stantaneous deliberation." 
Other courts have also found short breaks in an initial 
confrontation preceding a fatal shooting sufficient evidence 
of prior calculation and design. In State v. Balfour, No. 
45478 (8th Dist. Ct. App., 5-12-83), the defendant encoun-
tered the victim twice briefly and then went out to his car to 
obtain a sawed-off shotgun, and in State v. Whitehead, No. 
C-81 0183 (1st Dist. Ct. App., 1-13-82), the lapse of several 
minutes between an initial fist fight and a shooting were suf-
ficient to show prior calculation and design. For aggravated 
murder, the reflection need not be long, nor the plan elabo-
rate, but it must exist. In contrast, a court of appeals found 
insufficient prior calculation and design where (1) a shooting 
took place after a tussle at a bar entrance, (2) there was no 
break between the fight and the shooting, and (3) the defen-
dant did not go to the bar with the intent to kill. The court 
found that the shooting occurred during "an almost 'instanta-
neous eruption of events,"' which the court said did not "re-
flect the studied analysis that must reinforce prior calcula-
tion." State v. Richardson, 103 Ohio ,Ll,pp.3d 21, 658 l'J.E.2d 
321 (1995). 
In determining the existence of prior calculation and de-
sign, the relevant factors include: (1) whether the accused 
knew the victim prior to the crime, as opposed to a random 
meeting; (2) whether the relationship between the accused 
and victim was strained; (3) whether the accused used 
thought and preparation to decide on a weapon or the site 
of the homicide; and (4) whether the act was drawn out over 
a period of time as opposed to an almost instantaneous 
eruption of events. State v. Richardson, 1 03 Ohio App.3d 
21, 658 N.E.2d 321 (1995). 
See also State v. Goodwin, 84 Ohio St.3d 331 , 344, 703 
N.E.2d 1251 (1999) ("It was an action that required thought 
on his part to place the gun at the victim's forehead, and he 
took additional time to decide to pull the trigger in order to_ 
carry out a calculated plan to obtain money from the store. 
This was not a spur-of-the moment accidental shooting on 
the part of a robber."); State v. Palmer, 80 Ohio St.3d 543, 
570, 687 N.E.2d 685 (1997)("The events giving rise to the 
death of each victim may have been of a short duration, but 
the duration of the events was quite long enough for appel-
lant to have conceived of, adopted, and executed a calculat-
ed plan to kill each victim:'). 
AGGRAVATED MURDER: FELONY-MURDER 
The difference between murder and this type of aggravat-
ed murder is the commission of one of the enumerated 
felonies. This type of aggravated murder includes a pur-
poseful killing (1) during a kidnaping, rape, aggravated 
arson, arson, aggravated robbery, robbery, aggravated bur-
glary, burglary, or escape; (2) an attempt to commit one of 
these enumerated offenses; or (3) while fleeing after com-
mitting or attempting to commit one of these enumerated of-
fenses. 
Related Crimes 
The culpable mental state for this type of aggravated 
murder, like murder under R.C. 2903.02, is "purpose:· See 
State v. Tyler, 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 36, 553 N.E.2d 576 (1990) 
("Murder, under R.C. 2903.02, is any purposeful killing. As 
such, it is clearly a lesser included offense of aggravated 
murder under R.C. 2903.01 (B):') 
In Ohio, involuntary manslaughter "is a lesser included of-
fense to aggravated murder:· State v. Williams, 7 4 Ohio 
St.3d 569, 57 4, 660 N.E.2d 724 (1996). See also State v. 
Thomas, 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 533 N.E.2d 286 (1988) (syl-
labus, para. 1 ). It is defined as causing the death of another 
as the proximate result of committing a felony. The primary 
difference between aggravated murder and involuntary 
manslaughter is that the former requires the purpose to kill, 
while involuntary manslaughter only requires a death as the 
proximate result of a felony. State v. Campbell, 69 Ohio 
St.3d 38, 630 N.E.2d 339 (1994). The killing need not be 
purposeful. 
An instruction on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser-
included-offense of aggravated murder is justified only when 
the jury can reasonably find against the prosecution on the 
element of purpose and still find that the defendant's act 
proximately caused the death. State v. Campbell, 69 Ohio 
St.3d 38, 630 N.E.2d 339 (1 994). A defendant is entitled to 
an instruction on the lesser included offense of involuntary 
manslaughter, where there is evidence of the defendant's in-
toxication while committing an armed robbery and homicide 
because intoxication might lead a jury to conclude that the 
defendant did not act with the purpose to kiii. State v. 
Young, No. C-830757 (1st Dist. Ct. App., 5-14-86). 
Mens Rea: "Purpose" 
Ohio's variation of felony-murder differs from common-
law felony-murder as well as the statutory felony-murder 
recognized in most states. The Ohio rule does not punish 
accidental deaths committed during the commission of the 
enumerated offenses. The statute limits culpability to pur-
poseful killings and thus requires an intent to kill. "The re-
quirement that the killing must be purposeful is retained:' 
See Legislative Service Commission (1 973) ("The section 
expands upon the former offense of felony murder by listing 
kidnaping and escape, in addition to rape, arson, robbery 
and burglary, as the felonies during which a purposeful 
killing constitutes aggravated murder."). 
However, in State v. Thompson, 55 Ohio App.2d 17, 22, 
379 N.E.2d 245 (1 977), the language of the statute was ig-
nored. In that case, arsonists were held culpable for aggra-
vated murder in the death of a firefighter, who died while re-
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sponding to a fire caused by the defendants. The court of 
appeals held that where an actor has actual knowledge that 
other persons are exposed to a substantial risk of serious 
physical harm caused by the burning of a building, the ele-
ment of purpose to kill may be "presumed" from the natural 
and probable consequences of the actor's conduct. 
Arsonists have traditionally been held culpable under the 
common law for the resultant death of firefighters because it 
is foreseeable that firefighters will respond to a fire alarm 
and risk death combating the fire. The court in Thompson 
asked whether the deaths were so remote 
that such deaths could not be a natural and probable 
consequence of the act of arson? How do you show 
purpose such as we have here, for it is a rare call in-
deed for a defendant to step forward and say I intend-
ed to kill? Purpose certainly is shown by the acts, 
conduct and the knowledge exhibited in carrying out 
whatever is done by the person. 
Although it may be sound policy to hold arsonists responsi-
ble for the deaths of firefighters resulting from an arsonist's 
recklessness, it is not consistent with the aggravated murder 
statute, which limits culpability to deaths that are purposely 
caused. The defendants in Thompson were outrageously 
reckless; however, they did not purposely cause the death 
of the firefighter. 
Time Limitation 
The statute requires that the killing occur "while" the 
felony is being committed or attempted, or "while" the actor 
is "fleeing immediately" thereafter. 
The term "while" does not indicate ... that the killing 
must occur at the same instant as the attempted rape, 
or that the killing must have been caused by the at-
tempt, but, rather, indicates that the killing must be di-
rectly associated with the attempted rape as part of 
one continuance occurrence .... The evidence here 
showed that the murders were associated with the kid-
naping, robbery, and rapes "as part of one continuous 
occurrence." 
State v. Gooey, 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 23, 544 N.E.2d 895 
(1 989) (quoting State v. Cooper, 52 Ohio St.2d 163, 179-80, 
370 N.E.2d 725 (1977}). See also State v. Rojas, 64 Ohio 
St.3d 131, 131 32, 592 N.E.2d 1376 (1 992) (defendant did 
not rob his victim until hours after he had stabbed her and 
case reflects that he did not stab her in order to rob her). 
In State v. Williams, 74 Ohio St.3d 569, 577, 660 N.E.2d 
724 (1 996), the Supreme Court applied the felony-murder 
rule, even though the murder was accomplished before the 
attempted rape and the evidence did not suggest that the 
intent to rape was formed prior to the fatal assault. The 
term ''while," as used in the felony-murder statute, means 
that the death must occur as part of the acts leading up to, 
during, or immediately after the felony. Neither the felony-
murder statute nor the case law requires that the intent to 
commit the felony precede the murder: 
[E]ach of the crimes of which Williams was convicted 
occurred during one continuous incident. Accordingly, 
Williams should not be able to escape the felony-mur-
der rule by claiming the rape was merely an after-
thought .... In this case, the murder of Mr. Melnick 
was "associated" with the attempted rape of Mrs. 
Melnick "as part of one continuous occurrence:· 
See also State v. McNeill, 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 440-41, 700 
N.E.2d 596 (1998) ("Because the killing and predicate 
felony need not be simultaneous in order to constitute a 
felony-murder, the technical completion of one before the 
commission of the other does not remove a murder from the 
ambit of R.C. 2903.01 (B):')("R.C. 2903.01 (B) does notre-
quire that the felony be the motive for the killing:');State v. 
'\ Palmer, 80 Ohio St.3d 543, 570, 687 N.E.2d 685 
(1997)("[A]ppellant urges that the term 'while,' as that term 
appears in R.C. 2903.01 (B) and 2929.04(A)(7), requires 
proof that he intended to rob his victims at the time he killed 
them. However, in prior cases, this court has rejected any 
[such] notion .... ");State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 678 
N.E.2d 891 (1997) (Williams "rejected any notion that R.C. 
2903.01 (B) and 2929.04(A)(7) require proof that the offend-
er formed the intent to commit the pertinent underlying 
felony before or during the commission of the acts which re-
sulted in the murder victim's death:'). 
Accomplice Liability 
The 1981 amendment addressed the felony-murder cul-
pability of an accomplice in the felony. Culpability for aggra-
vated murder under the felony-murder statute requires that 
the aider and abettor have the specific intent to cause 
death. There can be no presumption, conclusive or other-
wise, of the specific intent (purpose to kill) merely because 
the offender participated in a crime "by force and violence or 
because the offense and the manner of its commission 
would be likely to produce death:' R.C. 2903.01 (D). This 
language appears to reject the position taken by the Ohio 
Supreme Court in State v. Lockett, 49 Ohio St.2d 48, 358 
N.E.2d 1062 (1976), modified, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 
(1978), which stated that an aider and abettor may be found 
to have the purpose to kill by engaging in a common design 
to commit robbery where the manner of its commission 
,~ would be reasonably likely to produce death. The language 
of the amendment seems to satisfy the concerns of the 
United States Supreme Court which, though not addressing 
the culpability issue, concluded that the Eighth 
Amendment's constitutional prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment precludes imposition of the death 
penalty on an aider and abettor who (1) does not himself 
kill, (2) does not attempt to kill, (3) does not intend that a 
killing occur, or (4) does not intend that lethal force be used. 
RC 2903.01 (D) was deleted by statutory amendment in 
1998. The deletion may be negligible because it involved 
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only an instruction, not a substantive change. 
In In re Washington, 81 Ohio St.3d 337, 341, 691 N.E.2d 
285 (1998), the Ohio Supreme Court examined the mens 
rea ("purpose") as applied to an accomplice. "Washington 
and four others planned and rehearsed an armed robbery. 
They intended to scare the victim into complying with their 
demands by brandishing a weapon, as it turn out, Watkins's 
loaded shotgun. Watkins's shotgun had been demonstrated 
to be capable of firing when Robinson shot the windshield of 
a parked car. Based on this and other evidence in the 
record, ... a rational trier of fact could have found the es-
sential element of intent to kill proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt:' The Court held that the 1981 amendment was con-
sistent with State v. Scott, 61 Ohio St.2d 155, 165, 400 
N.E.2d 375 (1980}, in which the Court had held that a "jury 
can infer an aider and abettor's purpose to kill where the 
facts show that the participants in a felony entered into a 
common design and either the aider or abettor knew that an 
inherently dangerous instrumentality was to be employed to 
accomplish the felony or the felony and the manner of its 
accomplishment would be reasonable likely to produce 
death:' 
1997 AMENDMENT 
A 1997 amendment added a third type of aggravated 
murder: the purposeful killing of a child under thirteen years 
of age at the time of the offense. The death penalty statute 
was also amended at the same time. See R.C. 
2929.04(A)(9). 
1998 AMENDMENT 
A 1998 amendment added two more types of aggravated 
murder: (1) a purposeful killing while under detention or 
breaking detention (as defined in 2921.01) as a result of a 
having been found guilty or having plead guilty to a felony, 
and (2) a purposeful killing of a law enforcement officer (as 
defined in 2911.01) with knowledge or reasonable cause to 
know that the victim was a law enforcement officer and if ei-
ther (a) the victim was engaged in official duties at the time 
of the offense or (b) the offender's specific purpose was to 
kill a law enforcement officer. 
